This paper presents a model in which in each of a succession of time periods the State and the private economy interact to determine rules under which the private agents will operate in the next period, and rules and resources that constrain interventions of the State in the next period. The set of State institutions, called regulators, that are the instruments of State intervention is endogenously determined in each period. The model is a multiperiod game consisting of two phases. The first is a (noncooperative) game played by private economic agents in each period, the rules for which are given by the regulators in the preceding period. The second phase is political. In each period the private agents acting politically determine the legal and budgetary constraints under which the regulators will operate in the next period, and thereby determine the noncooperative game to be played in the next period. Formal entities in the model allow a wide variety of regulatory instruments and transfer payments to be represented.
Introduction
Economic life seems to be dominated by the use of the power of the state to regulate, restrict and direct economic activity and to redistribute its fruits. Public opinion and the opinions of economists seem to be that interventions by the state * Tel.: (+ 1) 847-491.2531; fax: (1) 847--491.2530.
0928-5040/96/$15.00 Copyright 9 1996 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. PII S0928-5040(96) in economic affairs are not done very well. There are some who hold the view that state interventions are harmful, and others who hold the view that they are necessary to rectify failures of performance by the private economy. Economic theory recognizes the limits of validity of the classical welfare theorems, which express at a fundamental level the claim that a private market economy free of state regulatory intervention can be expected to produce efficient results. Economic theory provides a justification for regulatory intervention in cases of 'market failure', such as those due to significant indivisibilities, or to increasing returns to scale, or externalities. While some cases of intervention seem to be of this type, such as public utility regulation, it is difficult to believe that most interventions by the state in economic affairs are directed to correcting inefficiencies due to market failures. Indeed, many such interventions seem to achieve their objectives, whatever those may be, at the cost of introducing inefficiencies of their own.
On the one hand, business men, members of the public generally, as well as economists who concern themselves with governmental economic policy seem to understand very well the nature and sources of state intervention. It is generally understood that economic agents benefit if they can arrange that state power be used to change the rules that govern economic activity in their favor. For example, U.S. sugar growers, who must compete in the world economy with other sugar producing areas with lower costs, can improve their incomes if they can persuade the federal government to subsidize sugar. Real estate developers can benefit from changes in obscure provisions of the federal tax code, and so on. On this view, at least some and perhaps all state intervention in the economic system results from pressure by economic agents in pursuit of their own interests. Such interventions are then a natural development in any private economic system. For brevity we may use the term 'regulation' to refer broadly to state intervention in the economic system. On the view just alluded to, regulation is an endogenous political-economic phenomenon.
There is an extensive literature on regulation in economics. Noll (1989) presents a summary of this literature up to about 1988. As Noll points out, the oldest part of that literature deals with interventions as remedies for market failure. A subsequent component is aimed at assessing the effectiveness of state interventions. More recently since the 1970s with the publication of Stigler (1971), and Peltzman (1976) analytic attention has been paid to the political causes of regulation. In these papers the focus is on identifying 'interest groups' and trying to assess their relative powers by comparing benefits (positive and negative) to be obtained (or avoided) by a regulatory intervention, to the cost of organizing a group and of its political activity. In the more recent literature on endogenous regulation (surveyed by Hillman (1989)) two important classes of models can be distinguished, those in which there is political competition among opposing candidates or parties (Magee et al. (1989) , and Hillman and Ursprung (1988)), and those in which there is an incumbent government that seeks to maximize political
